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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED By DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ASSAULT.
The Supreme Court of California decides in People v.
Sylva, 76 Pac. 814, that pointing an unloaded gun at an-
what other, accompanied by a threat to discharge it,
Constitutes does not constitute an assault; nor does it con-
stitute an assault if the gun is loaded, but there is no attempt
to discharge it.
BANKRUPTCY.
The United States District Court (E. D. Pennsylvania)
decides In re National Mercantile Agency, 128 Fed. 639, that
Receivers: where a receiver was appointed for a bankrupt
R ght to Sue before the appointment of a trustee, and was
given power to proceed forthwith to collect and take pos-
session of all the assets of the bankrupt, he was not author.
ized to bring suit to collect such assets in a jurisdiction other
than the one in which he was appointed. See in connection
with this case note to the case of I. I. Case Plowworks v.
Finks, 26 C. C. A. 49. Compare also the very recent de-
cision of Great Western Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 128
Fed. 321 (U. S. C. C. A., Second Circuit).
CARRIERS.
The laws of North Carolina provide that if a common
carrier charge any person a greater or less compensation
Pass: than he charges any other person for a like ser-
Negligence: vice, the carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust
Personal discrimination and liable to fine. In McNeill v.
Injuries Durham and C. R. Co., 47 S. E. 765, it appeared
that the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the railway
company while riding on a pass which was void under the
statute. The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that
he was a passenger and entitled to recover as such, not being
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in pari delicto with the company in the violation of law,
Two judges dissent, and the prevailing and dissenting
opinions contain an excellent review of the authorities in
question.
Against the dissent of the chief justice, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina decides in McGraw v. Somthets Ry. Co.,
Passengers 47 S. E. 758, that a pcrson who, though having
a ticket, boards a train by getting on the plat-
form of the blind baggage car, has no right of action as a
passenger because of the conductor's pulling him off the car,
he not having told the conductor, when ordered to get off,
that he had a ticket, and the conductor not having seen a
ticket or supposed that he had one, The dissenting judge
says, " Neither the carrier nor its employees can assume
that a person in any car of a passenger train is a trespasser
merely because he is not in One of the cars provided for,
and usually occupied by, passengers," See on this point
Railroad v. Williams, 4o S. W. 350.
With two judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of the
same state holds in Clegg v, Southern Ry. Co., 47 S. E.
Refusal to 667, that where a railroad company refused to
Dellyer deliver a carload of fruit to the owner for the
specific reason that he would not pay the amount of freight
demanded, which was in excess of that due and offered by
the owner, and the fruit was injured by being frozen before
the railroad company discovered its error, the fact that at
the time he demanded the goods the bill of lading had not
been transferred to the owner by the bank to which the
goods were consigned was not fatal to his right to recover
for the injury to the fruit. Compare Railroad v. Barkhotse,
ioo Ala. 543.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
An act of the Legislature of Texas imposes upon railway
companies alone a penalty in favor of contiguous land-
Equal owners for allowing Johnson grass and Russian
Protection thistle to mature and go to seed on their prop.of the Laws erty. In Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railbay
Company v. Clay May, 24 S. C. R. 638, the Supreme Court
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of the United States decides that such statute does not deny
to such railway companies the equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court of the United States decides in Lydia
Bradley v. H. W. Lightcap, 24 S. C. R. 748, that the obliga-
Impairment tion of the contract of a mortgagee in possession
of Contract after condition broken, who afterwards bid in
Obllz.tl.. the property for less than the mortgage debt on
the sale in foreclosure proceedings initiated by her before the
Illinois Act of March 22, 1872, Sec. 30, went into effect, is
impaired by the change in the law made by the requirement
of that section that the master's deed be taken out within
a specified time after the expiration 6f the time for redemp-
tion, where failure to comply with this requirement is held
by the highest state court to destroy the right of possession
taken under the mortgage, to avoid the certificate of sale,
and to entitle the mortgagor, without payment of the mort-
gage debt, to recover possession in ejectment on the strength
of a perfect title. Compare Varnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S.
118.
DAMAGES.
With one judge dissenting, the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin decides in Arentsen v. Moreland, 99 N. W. 700, that
Inability to where at the time defendants contracted to sell
Perform certain land to plaintiffs they had sold to another
Contract all the timber thereon, and only held an option
to purchase the land, and for this reason knew that they
would not be able to comply with their contract to sell both
the land and the timber to plaintiff, plaintiff was entitled to
recover not only the amount paid, but damages for the loss
of his bargain, without regard to the fact that, at the time the
contract was made, plaintiff had knowledge of the sale of the
timber.
DEEDS.
In Slack v. Craft, 57 AtI. io4, the Court of Chancery
of New Jersey decides that where a purchaser of certain lots
oro was aware that his deed and a deed to certain ad-
joining lots have been mistakenly drawn so as
to leave a strip between the same unconveyed, but he made
no effort to have the mistake corrected, and destroyed his line
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fence, and erected a barn on foundations which were in fact
on complainantes lot as defined by such fences, he took the
risk of a subsequent reformation.
ELECTION.
A note and mortgage on personalty belohging to a wife
purported to be signed by the husband and wife, and the
mistake of payee sued on the note on the theory that the
Remedy husband signed as an authorized agent for the
wife, and that it was to her that the loan represented by the
note and mortgage was made. Plaintiff was unsuccessful
as against the wife, it appearing that the loan was not to the
wife alone and took no judgment. Under these facts the
Supreme Court of Mcligan decides in First Nat. Bank of
Reed City v, Sweet, 99 N. W. 86i, that the plaintiff was
not precluded from maintaining replevin for-the mortgaged
property. See Morris v. Robtnson 3 Barn and C. 196.
ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES.
In Brown v. Radnor Pp, Electric Light Co., 57 At. 904,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides that under the
Eminent Pennsylvania Act of May 8, 1889, P. L. 136,
Domain providing that every electric light company shall
have power to erect the necessary buildings and apparattis,
with a right to enter upon any public street, lane, alley, or
highway to inspect, alter, and repair its system of distribu-
tion, an electric light company has power to enter upon the
bed of a turnpike road and erect its poles and string its wires
notwithstanding the objection of abutting owners owning
the fee in the bed of the road. One judge dissents.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Against the dissent of three judges the Supreme Court
of Kansas decides in McCann v. Johnson County Telephone.
Telephone Co,, 76 Pac. 870, that the construction and main-
Line: tenance of a telephone line upon a rural high-
Aditonl way is not an additional sevitude for whichServitude, compensation must be made to the owner of the
land o..r which the highway is laid. Compare Eels v.
American Telegraph and Telephone Co., 143 N. Y. 133.
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EVIDENCE.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides in
McCarthy v. Peach, 70 N. E. io29, that testimony of a wit-
Telephone ness. whu was present in the room with plaintiff
Conversattons while the latter was telephoning to defendant as
to what witness heard plaintiff say during the course of the
conversation, was admissible to show the conversation, al-
though the witness had no personal knowledge as to whom
plaintiff was talking with, and did not hear anything that
defendant said, and did not know that defendant heard any.-
thing that plaintiff said, plaintiff testifying that the con-
versation was with defendant. See also Lord Electric Co.
v. Morill, 178 Mass. 3o4.
FELLOW-SERVANTS.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Allne A. Dixon,
Telezrph 24 S. C. R. 683, that negligence of a local tele-
operator: graph operator and station agent of a railway
Firemen company in observing and reporting by tele-
graph to the train dispatcher the movement of trains past his
station, which causes the death of a fireman on such railway,
without any fault or negligence the train dispatcher, is the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the fireman, the risk of
which the latter assumes.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
In John Deere Plow Co. v. Wyland, 76 Pac. 863, the
Supreme Court of Kansas decides that a single transaction
DoInt by a foreign corporation may constitute a doing
Business of business in this state within the meaning of
In State the state law making certain requirements of
foreign corporations doing business in the state, where such
transaction is a part of the ordinary business of the corpora-
tion, and indicates a purpose to carry on a substantial part
of its dealings there. The decision cites the statement in
13 American and English Encyclopoedia of Law (2d edi-
tion), 869, which is directly to the contrary and refers to
the cases there cited, but refuses to adopt this view, holding
that these cases "turn rather upon the character than upon
the amount of business done."
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FRANCHISES.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Nebraska Tele-
phone Co. v. City of Fremont, 99 N. W. 81 r, that forfeiture
Foteltur of the franchises and easements of a public ser-
of Grant vice corporation in the streets can be declared
and enforced only by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
city claiming a forfeiture cannot be a judge in its own cause,
or invade the privileges or destroy the property of such a
corporation in the absence of judicial warrant for so doing.
INSURANCE.
In Malin v. Mercantile Town Mut. Ins. Co., 8o S. W.
56, the St. Louis Court of Appeals dcides that a failure to
.-cping et cc1iuply literally with a requirement in a fire-in-
of Books surance policy that insured shall keep a set of
books, presenting a complete record of business transactions,
does not work a forfeiture of the policy; but its purpose is
accomplished when insured produces data from which the
amount and value of the goods in stock at the time of the
fire can be reasonably estimated.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
The Act of June 9, 1891, Sec. 5, P. L 259 (Penna.),
requires a certificate signed by at least twelve reputable
Ltan qualified electors of the county to be annexed
to a petition for liquor license. The Supreme
Court of the state, with two judges dissenting, holds In re
Forsi's License, 57 At. 991, that a certificate is fatally de-
fective where five of the signatures are those of partnerships
or trading companies.
JOINT TORT-FEASORS.
A recovery against one only of several defendants charged
with joint and concurring negligence does not deprive such
Removal of defendant of any federal right because, if it had
Causes been sued alone, the diversity of citizenship ex-
isting between it and the plaintiff would have authorized
the removal of the cause from the state court to a Federal
Circuit Court: United States Supreme Court in Southern
Railway Company v. James L. Carson, 24 S. C. R. "609.
See in connection with this case Powers v. Chesapeake and
0. R. Co., Y69 U. S. 92.
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JURORS.
In Baldwin v. State, 47 S. E. 558, the Supreme Court of
Georgia decides that a juror is not disqualified for serving
Disqual. on a case by reason of the fact that his wife is
ficatron a second cousin of the wife of one of the parties
in interest. Compare, however, the very recent Louisiana
decision of State ex rel. Ribbeck v. Foster, 36 Southern, 554,
where the husbands of two sisters are held to be "brothers-
in-law" within the meaning of the law providing for the
recusation of judges.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
In Holder v. Camnon Mfg. Co., 47 S. E. 481, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina holds that one who causes the dis-
Discharge charge of another from the service of a third
from person maliciously and wilfully is liable to the
Employment injured party in damages; and to show malice
it is not necessary to show actual ill-will or hatred, but it
is sufficient if the act be done without legal excuse. It is
further decided that the conduct of a servant in going on a
strike and refusing to make up for lost time cannot right-
fully be used by his employer to effect his discharge from a
subsequent employment. Two judges dissent.
In Bryson v. Philadelphia Brewing Co., 57 Atl. 1105, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that where, in an ac-
Relation: tion to recover for damages sustained by the
Evidence alleged negligence of a driver of a beer wagon,
the evidence showed that the employer of the driver was in
fact the owner of the wagon, which he had bought from the
defendant brewing company, and that he was engaged in
buying beer from the brewing company and selling it to his
own customers, no recovery could be had against the brewing
company, although it permitted its initials to remain on the
wagon. In this connection compare the cases of Staples v.
Ely, i C. and P. 614, and Howard v. Ludwig (N. Y.), 57
App. Div. 9.
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NEGLIGENCE.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
Fish v. Kirlin-Gray Electric Co.. 99 N. W. 1092, that where
Sales: an electric company sold an arc light to a church
Injuries to under a contract by which the company was
Third Persons bound to furnish electricity and keep the light
in repair, and by reason of its negligence in failing to prop-
erly repair the light, after notice, it fell, and injured plaintiff
while attending services, defendant was liable for such in-
jury. The court distinguishes the case from the well-known
line of decisions which define the liability of the vendor of
personal property to third persons sustaining injuries from
a defect in such property, on the ground that in the present
case there were continuing duties to be performed. Compare
Thomas, Adn'r, v. Maysville Gas Co., 56 S. W. 153, 53 L.
R. A. 147.
RAILROADS.
By the great weight of authority, the decisive tests as to
whether a branch railroad track is for public or private
Branch purposes arc these: Is the track to be opened
Tracks to the public, on equal terms to all having oc-
casion at any time to use it, so that all can demand that they
be served without discrimination, as of right? If so, and
the track is subject to governmental control, under general
laws, as are the main lines of a railroad, then the use is pub-
lic and the case a proper one for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. Co., 51 At]. ooi.
TAXATION.
In Solomon L. Swarts v. L. F. Hammer, Jr., 24 S. C. R.
695, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that
Bankruptcy property in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy
is not exempted from liability to state taxation
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 or by any of its amend-
ments. This question had been passed on by some of. the
lower federal courts, but this is the first time the Supreme
Court has had occasion to deal with it.
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TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
A telegraph message signed by plaintiff's mother, direct-
ing him to " come at once," was delayed in transmission by
Delivery of the telegraph company, so that plaintiff missed
mlessage: the train on which he might have gone to his
Damages mother, and the next train which he took did not
make connection, so that plaintiff, in order to hasten his
arrival, walked nine miles. His mother was not seriously
ill when the message was sent, but wished to see plaintiff on
business. Under these facts the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Bowers v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 47
S. E. 597, although holding that recovery may be had for
mental anguish occasioned by the negligence of another, de-
cides that it was plaintiff's own misapprehension which
caused him any mental anguish he might have suffered, and
not the negligence of the telegraph company.
TRUSTS.
The Court of Errors and Appeals in New Jersey decides
in Johnston v. Reilly, 57 Atl. 1O49, that a constructive trust
Constructive will arise against a person who by falsely repre-
Trusts senting to B that he is acting in the interest of
C obtains from B property which B intended to give to C,
and the trust may be enforced by C irrespective of the ques-
tion whether C had an enforceable claim against B.
WILLS.
In Mclntyre v. McIntyre, 47 S. E. 5O1, the Supreme
Court of Georgia holds that the rule of the English courts
that cancellations with a lead pencil are pre-
Alteration: sumed to have been deliberative, and not final,
Lead Pencil
has not been generally adopted by the American
courts. It is decided that the general rule that a presump-
tion arises that cancellations or obliterations found upon a
will offered for probate were made by the deceased, and
were intended to operate as a revocation where the paper
offered for probate was found among decedent's papers, ap-
plies where the cancellations were made with a lead pencil,
but the fact that they are so made may be considered by the
jury with other evidence in determining whether the pre-
sumption of revocation has been rebutted.
